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ABSTRACT 
A renewed discussion has triggered on if and how flexicurity strategies 
could tackle the explosion of unemployment, increasing poverty rates, 
and precarious employment. Do flexicurity policies withstand during 
crisis times and shelter labor markets from shocks? Are the ongoing 
reforms being characterized by the well-balanced development of both 
flexibility and security? The paper attempts to investigate the 
implementation of flexicurity policies as a labor market tool during the 
years of crisis in different flexicurity regimes. The study will focus its 
attention on employment policies adopted in Denmark which is 
considered as one of the two birthplaces of flexicurity concept and 
Greece which is one of the countries that has been hit the worst by the 
crisis. 
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‘Real’ Flexicurity Worlds in action: 
Evidence from Denmark and Greece 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to the latest available data the euro area (EA19) seasonally-
adjusted unemployment rate was 10.1 percent in July 2016, down from 
10.8 percent in July 2015 which has been the lowest rate recorded in the 
euro area since July 2011. Τhe EU28 unemployment rate was 8.6 percent 
in July 2016 down from 9.4 percent in July 2015 which has also been the 
lowest rate recorded in the EU28 since March 2009 (Eurostat 2016a). At 
the same time for the first quarter of 2016, seasonally adjusted GDP rose 
by 0.3 percent in the euro area and by 0.4 percent in the EU28 compared 
with the same quarter of the previous year (Eurostat 2016b).  
At first sight, these figures provide a sense of optimism about the 
employment situation in Europe. However, a deeper look into the 
figures gives us reasons to concern and believe that the light at the end 
of the tunnel is still far from here and we need a long way to run in order 
Europe to regain its growth momentum and deliver its prosperity 
mission. We are probably running a period of a slow and fragile 
recovery. According to Eurostat figures 21.063 million men and women 
in the EU28 (16.307 million in the EU19), of whom 4.276 million young 
persons (under 25) were unemployed (2.969 million were in the euro 
area) (Eurostat 2016a). Divergences and across countries, particularly in 
the euro zone, remain high. Even in economies which perform 
comparatively well, unemployment is becoming structural as evidenced 
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by the increasing number of long-term unemployed. Levels of those at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion and inequality increased in many 
Member States, with growing divergences among countries. Children 
have been experiencing an increasing risk of poverty or social exclusion 
in the last years as the situation of working-age parents worsened 
(European Council 2015). The risk of poverty increased by 1.4 percent in 
2015 and more than 122 million European citizens have been 
experiencing the spectre of poverty (Eurostat 2016c) and running the 
risk of social exclusion (Dafermos and Papatheodorou 2012, 2013, 
Marques et al. 2015).  
Under this vein, the economic crisis, the implementation of austerity 
policies as an antidote to the rising public debts and deficits as well as 
the employment challenges, lead the debate over the future of the EU. 
As the character of the new welfare state design in the era of austerity 
has been changing (Taylor Gooby 2013, Petmesidou and Guillen 2015) 
the fight against increased unemployment due to a dramatic fall in the 
labor demand, the weakening of labor market dynamics, the debilitation 
of social protection systems and the lack of investments in knowledge 
are at the center of attention of policy makers.  
A renewed discussion has triggered on if and how flexicurity strategies 
could tackle the explosion of unemployment, the increasing rates of 
poverty and precarious employment. Do flexicurity policies withstand 
during crisis times and shelter labor markets from shocks? Are the 
ongoing reforms being characterized by the well-balanced development 
of both flexibility and security? 
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 On the one hand, flexibility in employment relations constitutes the 
core answer to the adjustment problems that firms have to deal with. 
Οn the other hand security is a vital component of a well-structured 
labor market and provides the necessary policy tools to the weaker part 
of the employment equation, the employee, to overcome the difficulties 
that the new employment reality arises. The preferential favor of 
flexibility measures increases the risk of labor market segmentation 
while at the same time undermines social stability by weakening the 
social fabric as it increases further in working poverty incidences 
(Dafermos and Papatheodorou 2012, Papatheodorou 2014). At the same 
time, an increased social security dimension provides income security 
and advances labor market reintegration however it collides with the 
constraints of a tight budget balance and a decreasing real GDP, 
therefore, limiting the (already scarce) room for maneuvering of some 
Member States (especially the Southern countries).    
The paper attempts to investigate the implementation of flexicurity 
policies as a labor market tool during the years of crisis in different 
flexicurity regimes. The study will focus its attention on employment 
policies adopted in Denmark which is considered as one of the two 
birthplaces of flexicurity concept and Greece which is one of the 
countries that hit most from the crisis. The rest of the paper is structured 
as follows. In the second part, we will present basic principles of 
flexicurity as developed in European Union’s labor market toolkit. In the 
third part, we will present in short the different flexicurity regimes that 
exist as well as we will highlight the framework of our analysis. It is more 
than clear that the starting line of the two countries is different thus the 
outcome of the process is rather easily predicted. However, it is quite 
  4 
interesting to see if and how different flexicurity strategies adopted 
according to different flexicurity regimes within the European Union. In 
the fourth part, we will sketch out the adoption and the implementation 
of key flexicurity measures in Denmark, and Greece. In the final section, 
we will sum up the main findings of the research and discuss some key 
lessons derived from the study of ‘real’ flexicurity worlds in action during 
the crisis times. 
 
2. The concept of flexicurity 
 
The fundamental idea behind the concept of flexicurity is that flexibility 
and security are not contradictory to one another, but in many situations 
can mutually supportive. Flexibility is not the monopoly of the 
employers, just as security is not the monopoly of the employees 
(Madsen 2006:3). In response to the dominant deregulation of the 
1980s, the notion of flexicurity claims that investment in social policies is 
not a wasteful burden but instead constitutes an economic production 
factor (Wilthagen, 1998). It focuses on measures that offer sufficient 
flexibility on the labor market while at the same time offering sufficient 
security, regardless of whether this flexibility or security is demanded by 
employees or by employers. Much depends on if and how member 
states take up the flexicurity ideas and on the content of the policies and 
regulations they implement (Bekker and Wilthagen 2008:69). The notion 
of flexicurity has been widely used in the 2000s to reconcile the needs of 
a flexible labor market with those of a robust social security. The 
appearance of flexicurity as a policy tool dates back to the 1990s and 
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coincides with a series of labor market reforms that took place primarily 
in two EU Member States: the Netherlands and Denmark. During his 
term of office from 1992 to 2001, Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen brought out the ‘magical cocktail flexicurity’ as a 
combination of easy hiring and firing (flexibility for employers) and high 
benefits for the unemployed (security for employees). Around the same 
time the Dutch sociologist H. Adriaansen, launched the concept of 
flexicurity and associated it to the need of strengthening the position of 
temporary workers without compromising flexibility (Van Oorschot 
2004). The notion was widely used also in Denmark in the 1990s for a 
number of labor market reforms (Madsen 2006).  
The literature on flexicurity is very recent and goes back to the 1990s 
and early 2000s when flexicurity is at times a strategy, a state of affairs 
and sometimes an analytical tool (Madsen 2006:3). Wilthagen (1998) 
defines it as a coordinated policy strategy; Wilthagen and Rogowski 
(2002:241) refer to a synchronized strategy directed towards weaker 
labor groups, while Ferrera et al. (2001) associate flexicurity with the 
fight against social exclusion. A totally different position is expressed by 
Tangian (2004) who sees flexicurity as a response to the economic need 
to increase the competitiveness of the European economies, thus 
promoting liberalization regardless of security concerns (which are only 
used as a way to reach a compromise between employers and 
employees). Madsen, (2008:74-75) paves the way towards a more 
pragmatic vision of flexicurity by proposing the idea of the “golden 
Triangle” based on flexible labor markets, generous unemployment 
support and strong emphasis on activation measures (like skill upgrading 
and requalification of unemployed workers). The European Commission 
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(2007a) follows this direction but adopts a more institutional definition 
based on four pillars (with more emphasis on lifelong learning and on 
reconciliation family-work with respect to Madsen 2004). Τhe most 
commonly used systematisation of flexicurity is the so-called ‘flexicurity 
matrix’ by Wilthagen and Tros (2004). The matrix provides a framework 
for classifying the state of the labor market/employment policy in a 
country whereby a degree of numerical (both external and internal), 
functional and wage flexibility allows for the timely and adequate 
adjustment of labor markets and individual companies to changing 
conditions, in order to maintain and enhance competitiveness and 
productivity. At the same time, a degree of security should be provided 
that helps workers – especially those in a weaker position – with labor 
market participation and social inclusion (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). 
Τhey perceive flexicurity as “a degree of job, employment, income and 
‘combination’ security that facilitates the labor market careers and 
biographies of workers with a relatively weak position and allows for 
enduring and high quality labor market participation and social inclusion, 
while at the same time providing (2) a degree of numerical (both external 
and internal), functional and wage flexibility that allows for labor 
markets’ (and individual companies’) timely and adequate adjustment to 
changing conditions in order to enhance competitiveness and 
productivity” (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). 
The wish to combine flexibility with security is also evident in the policy 
discourse at EU level, in particular in the Commission’s Green paper from 
1997 Partnership for a New Organization of Work, which states (p.12): 
“The key issue for employees, management, the social partners and 
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policy makers alike is to strike the right balance between flexibility and 
security”. 
Table 1: The Wilthagen Matrix 
             
 
                  Security 
Flexibility     
     
Jobsecurity 
(keeping your 
job) 
Income security 
(unemployment 
benefits) 
Employment 
security 
(getting a new 
job) 
Combination 
security 
(work-life 
balance) 
Numerical flexibility 
(hire and fire) 
 
    
Functional flexibility 
(between tasks) 
 
    
Working time 
flexibility 
 
    
Wage flexibility 
 
    
Source: T. Wilthagen & Tros (2004) 
 
Table 2: Examples of flexicurity policies 
 
Source: T. Wilthagen & Tros (2004) 
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The wish to combine flexibility with security is also evident in the policy 
discourse at EU level, in particular in the Commission’s Green paper from 
1997 Partnership for a New Organization of Work, which states (p.12): 
“The key issue for employees, management, the social partners and 
policy makers alike is to strike the right balance between flexibility and 
security”. 
At a time when most European countries are facing chronically high 
unemployment rates but the needed labor market reforms often face 
strong political opposition – for fear that they can significantly erode job 
and income security – flexicurity model as developed in Denmark and 
the Netherlands seems to suggest that this fear is unfounded and that it 
is possible to reduce the unemployment rate with a model that balances 
flexibility with security.  
In the 2000s the concept of flexicurity was proposed in the European 
discourse as a guideline to modernising employment policies and 
welfare provisions. In 2007 the European Commission promoted this 
idea to a key policy concept and defines flexicurity as “an integrated 
strategy to enhance, at the same time, flexibility and security in the labor 
market” (European Commission 2007a). Flexicurity was incorporated 
into the European Employment Strategy 2007 (and in the Lisbon 
Agenda): guideline 21 calls for Member States “to promote flexibility 
combined with employment security” and to implement employment 
policies aimed at achieving full employment, improving quality and 
productivity at work, and strengthening social and territorial cohesion. 
The document proposes a set of policy components, reaffirmed later 
within the EU-2020 strategy. These are: 
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1. Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements (FCA): The availability 
of contractual arrangements, providing adequate flexibility for both 
employer and employees in a balanced combination with security and 
activation offers via modern labor laws, collective agreements, and work 
organization. 
2. Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies (LLL): strategies to ensure 
the continual adaptability and employability of workers, particularly the 
most vulnerable. 
3. Effective labor market policies (ALMP): policies helping people to cope 
with rapid change, reduce unemployment spells, and ease the transition 
to new jobs. 
4. Modern social security systems (MSS) further divided into 4.a. Social 
security systems and 4.b. Reconciliation of work and private life: systems 
that provide adequate income support, encourage employment and 
facilitate labor mobility. It includes a broad coverage of social protection 
provisions helping people to combine work with private life and family 
responsibilities. 
The difference in socio-economic, institutional and historical 
backgrounds among European countries pushed the Commission to 
propose country specific pathways to meet the challenge of flexicurity: 
(i) tackling contractual segmentation, (ii) developing flexicurity within 
enterprises and offering transition security, (iii) tackling skills and 
opportunity gaps among the workforce, (iv) improving opportunities for 
benefit recipients and informally employed workers (European 
Commission 2007a and European expert group on flexicurity 2007). 
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3. One model or different flexicurity regimes? 
 
The idea of pathways signals that the EU is aware that different 
countries face different challenges. This variety and diversity of welfare 
states across Europe are linked to historical choices leading to 
subsequent economic and social institutions. In a path-dependent 
process, “history matters”: it has a far-reaching impact, partly due to the 
cultural and value systems that underlie historical choices. Although an 
EU-led convergence of national policies can be recognized, different 
modalities of flexicurity or combinations of flexibility and security can be 
observed. To some extent, these modalities of flexicurity can be 
considered functional equivalents that are compatible with diversity in 
the national styles of regulation or regimes that have emerged over the 
years. Thus, resulting from consultations and negotiations at the 
national level, flexicurity can take different forms from country to 
country. Member states should assess their own situation and identify 
their own meaningful flexicurity pathways to cope with different labor 
market challenges. 
The suggested pathways and the need to analyze empirically EU 
Member States’ performances and trends led European Commission 
(European Commission 2006, 2007b) and academia to suggest robust 
cross-country statistical measures concerning ‘how flexicure’ countries 
are (Sperber, 2005, Muffels, Wilthagen, Chung (2010). They attempted 
to classify the EU Member States into clusters based on their flexicurity 
model in order to detect possible commonalities and divergences in this 
context. All these studies define and analyze a set of flexicurity 
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indicators, identify common patterns across countries, and cluster 
countries according to performance. Flexibility is broken down into 
institutional and factual flexibility. Institutional flexibility is represented 
by the OECD indicators of strictness of employment protection 
legislation both for regular and temporary employment. Factual 
flexibility is based on statistics on atypical work and involuntary part-
time employment. Security is represented by general social security 
expenditure and social security benefits (cash benefits) (Tangian 2010:2-
3).  
The European Commission (2006) provided the first attempt at mapping 
different flexicurity systems/ models in Member countries along two 
flexibility and security taxes. A preliminary taxonomy for flexicurity 
systems/models covering 18 EU Member States is provided, using 
principle component analysis and cluster analysis. Accordingly, five 
clusters are identified showing the following main characteristics: 
■ The Nordic system is differentiated by high security, intermediate-to-
high flexibility in working arrangements, and intermediate-to-high 
taxation in labor markets. The model is characterized by a high incidence 
of advanced forms of flexible work organization and by moderate levels 
of external flexibility, complemented by the large role given to lifelong 
learning policies, vocational training, and R&D spending, as well as active 
labor strategies that involve high budgetary costs for policymakers. 
■ The Anglo-Saxon system shows a high degree of flexibility (i.e. looser 
employment protection legislation), combined with relatively low 
security (i.e. intermediate-to-low spending on labor market policies) and 
low taxation. It is characterized by high external flexibility and low 
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segmentation and associated with high rates of secondary education 
attainment, moderate intensity of vocational training, low spending in 
activation policies and moderate reductions in poverty rates. The model 
involves relatively low budgetary costs. 
■ The Continental system is associated with intermediate-to-low 
flexibility, intermediate-to-high security, and intermediate-to-high 
taxation. The share of temporary and part-time employment is around 
average. Countries in this system record the second highest expenditure 
for active employment policies and the highest total expenditure for 
social protection. 
■ The Mediterranean system presents a combination of low(est) 
flexibility, intermediate-to-low security and no clear pattern on taxation. 
While expenditure on social protection and active employment rates are 
around the average EU level, participation in lifelong learning (LLL) is 
relatively low. Despite the rigidity, the percentage of temporary 
employment is the highest. 
■ Eastern Europe (plus Italy) is identified with insecurity, lower-to-
medium flexibility and medium levels of taxation. In general, a low share 
of temporary and part-time employment is observed in these markets. 
Total expenditure on social protection and active labor market policies 
tends to be low. Low mobility and low participation in lifelong learning 
schemes are also frequently observed in the countries under this cluster. 
The European Commission’s attempt was extended and revised later on 
by the Commission itself as well as by two other studies, which, by 
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running similar analysis, drew comparable conclusions European 
Commission, 2007b; Ciuca et al, 2009 and Laporsek and Dolenc 2011). 
The latest study performing a similar exercise was done by Auer and 
Chatani (2011). They ran principle component analysis based on seven 
sub-indicators in order to group all 27 EU Member States into seven 
clusters. Accordingly, Northern European countries plus the Netherlands 
have high scores of both security and flexibility indicators. Anglo-Saxon 
countries (UK, IE) combine average levels of labor market security with 
high external flexibility. Labor markets in Continental Europe represent a 
combination of high income and employment security with average to 
low external flexibility. High employment stability, lack of sufficient 
institutions to provide sufficient social security and lack of modern work 
organization are general characteristics of the Mediterranean cluster. 
The new Member States, with the exception of Slovenia, show a 
combination of below average levels of both flexibility and security. In 
the Baltic States, the lack of labor market security is much more visible. 
In particular income, employment and representation security score low 
in the last two groups.  
The economic crisis that began in 2008 caused a substantial shock in 
European labor markets. The average unemployment rate across the 
European Union (EU) increased from 7.2 percent in 2007 to 10.4 percent 
in 2015 (it reached 10.9 percent in 2013), with far larger increases in 
some EU member states (Greece 24.5 percent). Governments responded 
by implementing measures to cushion the impact on the labor market 
and assist workers who lost their jobs. The European Commission 
encouraged governments to ensure that these measures were 
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consistent with the principles associated with flexicurity (European 
Council, 2009). 
Undoubtedly the concept of flexicurity has been challenged by the crisis. 
Employment regimes, and thus the components of flexicurity, affected 
by the drive to austerity, however, historical and institutional factors 
seemed to have played their own role in the capacity of the European 
countries to return stronger from the crisis. Before the crisis, Denmark 
developed a labor market system that combined a numerically flexible 
labor market with a high degree of social, income and employment 
security. On the other hand, Greece developed traditional and 
segmented labor markets, with low unemployment insurance and 
limited spending on active labor market measures. 
The analysis that follows does not aim to highlight only the differences 
between the two countries. It is more than clear that Denmark as a 
member of the Scandinavian cluster and birthplace of flexicurity and 
Greece as a member of the Mediterranean cluster stand at different 
starting positions. The strong tradition of the Scandinavian welfare state 
with adequate fiscal buffers vis a vis the inadequate welfare structures 
that characterize Greece makes the outcome of the presentation rather 
predictable from the beginning. However, the study of the two cases will 
give us the opportunity to see real flexicurity worlds in action during the 
crisis times. As we will see below flexicurity is not a silver bullet which 
solves labor market problems immediately but rather an arsenal of 
policies from which the appropriate mix of elements should be chosen in 
order to accelerate towards recovery. The two different stories bring to 
the surface one of the key differences among flexicurity clusters. 
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Inclusive flexicurity vis a vis ‘unilateral’ non-inclusive flexicurity. As we 
will see flexicurity is not about a free flexibility ‘meal’ as in the long run 
the flexibilization of labor market needs to be offset by strong support 
during employment and unemployment transitions. In order to maintain 
in and out flows to employment strong and inclusive activation, policies 
are required avoiding at the same time great pitfalls such as long-term 
unemployment and the depreciation of human capital.       
To reflect aggravation of the situation in 2008–2011, changes in the 
output gap and public debt, size of bailout packages and increases in the 
unemployment rate are considered. 
 
4.  Denmark and Greece 
 
4.1  Denmark 
In the flexicurity literature, the Danish employment system is often 
referred to as a prime example of a labor market with a well-functioning 
flexicurity arrangement – even to such a degree that the “Danish model” 
and “flexicurity” are sometimes seen as almost identical (Madsen 2008). 
The Danish road to fame has been supported by a number of impressive 
statistics. Before the crisis times, the Danish employment rate of 79.7 
percent (in 2008) was the second highest among the EU member states. 
The rate of unemployment was 3.5 percent (in 2008), the lowest across 
the EU (Eurostat 2014). The Danish labor market model is often depicted 
as a “golden triangle” of flexicurity. The model combines high mobility 
between jobs with a comprehensive social safety net for the 
unemployed and an equally important set of active labor market policies 
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(ALMP) attaching conditions to the claiming of unemployment and social 
benefits, and also including programs to enhance qualifications and thus 
job finding chances for jobless an active labor market policy (Andersen 
and Svarer 2007). Measured on a year-to-year basis, every year about 25 
percent of all employees are newcomers to their specific employer 
(Madsen 2008). 
 
Since 2008, Denmark has like most other European countries fallen into 
a deep recession. This was the combined result of the steep decline in 
the international economy and the bursting of a national housing bubble 
that had developed in since the beginning of the decade and accelerated 
after 2005. From the peak of the business cycle in the spring of 2008 to 
the bottom of the crisis a year later, Danish GDP fell by 8 percent on a 
quarterly basis (Madsen 2013). The crisis led to a severe decline in 
aggregate demand, and as a consequence employment fell and 
unemployment soared (Andersen 2015). Reacting more slowly to the 
downturn, total employment reached its lowest level in the first quarter 
of 2012, having declined by 7.7 percent. The unemployment rates 
increased dramatically from 3.1 percent in the second quarter of 2008 to 
8.2 percent in the beginning of 2011. From having had one of the lowest 
levels of unemployment in the EU, Denmark moved close to the middle 
of the rank (Madsen 2013). Denmark is found among the countries, 
where both the relative and the absolute increase in unemployment 
have been most dramatic. In relative terms, Denmark is only surpassed 
by the Baltic States, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Since Denmark entered 
the crisis with a very low level of unemployment, the relative increase is 
somewhat biased. However, also measured by the absolute increase 
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Denmark is clearly above the average for the EU-27 (Madsen 2013). In a 
flexicurity labor market with flexible firing rules, it is to be expected that 
output declines have a large immediate effect on employment 
(Andersen 2012, Madsen 2013). By 2012 the employment rate had 
decreased by 3.6 percent which is significantly above the average for the 
EU. The steep decline rose questions regarding the efficiency of 
flexicurity and the ability of flexicurity model to sustain external shocks 
(Andersen 2012, Andersen and Svarer 2012). The key issue is the labor 
market’s adjustment capability, in particular, whether a crisis translates 
into lasting structural problems that make it difficult to bring 
employment back to its pre-crisis level. Under this fear a set of policies 
adopted in three key areas. 
 
Fiscal policy initiatives, the issue of “growth packages” was high on the 
political agenda. Since the spring of 2009, a number of concrete 
expansionary measures have been undertaken. The measures 
introduced during 2009 and subsequent years include access for the 
municipalities to increase their investments beyond the existing 
spending limit, a state subsidy to the renovation of private and several 
public “investment packages” in infrastructure, energy saving etc. In this 
way, the effects of the economic downturn on income and 
unemployment were significantly dampened however the backside of 
this, of course, was that the public budgets have deteriorated rather 
dramatically during the crisis. This resulted in the recommendation from 
the European Commission to restrict the deficits and the subsequent 
political agreement for fiscal recovery in 2011 (Madsen 2013). 
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Working-time and wage flexibility, in March 2009 the existing option for 
employers to reduce working hours in case of a temporary fall in the 
demand for its products was made more flexible. The scheme operates 
under the heading of “work sharing” and implies that the workers 
alternate between periods of work and periods, where they receive 
unemployment benefits. Normally the maximum duration of work 
sharing is 13 weeks, but employers can apply for a prolongation by 
another 13 weeks. In quantitative term, the scheme has not become 
prominent. Thus, in mid-2009 only a total of 25.000 workers took part in 
work sharing. By the end of 2012, their number had fallen to about 
2,000 persons (Madsen 2013). 
 
Changes to the content of ALMP, in February 2009, a broad political 
agreement was reached inspired by a proposal from the social partners. 
It implied a number of changes in the rules for active labor market 
programs. The changes were all aimed at targeting the programs more 
towards upgrading the skills of the unemployed in the light of the 
composition of labor demand, a slightly higher priority to training and 
also more intensive contact with the unemployed in the form of 
frequent meetings with counselors at the job centre. The most 
important elements can be summarized in the following points: (a) The 
access to education for unemployed was widened and recipients of cash 
benefits, which have other problems than just unemployment, were 
now to be activated every 12 months (instead of 6) to allow for a more 
flexible activation of this vulnerable target group, (b) more effective 
efforts adopted to reduce youth unemployment including more job-
rotation for young persons, more young to take part in the adult-
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apprenticeship-scheme, targeted programs for young persons with lack 
of basic education and more traineeships for graduates, (c) strengthened 
efforts to reduce the drop-out rate especially from the vocational 
education system took place. While not representing a drastic break 
with previous policies, the many minor reforms can be interpreted as 
pointing toward a more flexible approach to active labor market policy 
and also implies the allocation of more resources to interventions highly 
associated with the “work first” approach (Madsen 2013). In June 2014, 
a new reform package which regulates the issues of the organization, 
steering, and financing of active labor market policy agreed and has 
been implemented since 2015. The reform adopts a new regional 
organization and aims at bringing more unemployed into lasting 
employment as fast as possible and decreasing structural 
unemployment. It focuses on an individual, meaningful and job-targeted 
effort, a targeted education, an improved cooperation between job 
centers and companies and a flexible but intensive contact with the 
unemployed in the form of interviews and active offers (Danish Ministry 
of Employment 2014). 
  
Reform of the unemployment benefit system for insured unemployed, 
the aim of the reform is to increase the supply of labor by motivating 
unemployed to look for work more eagerly after a shorter duration of 
unemployment out of fear for exhausting their benefits. It has the 
following elements: (a) Previously, an insured unemployed could receive 
unemployment benefits for four years out of the last six years. After the 
reform the maximum period will be two years out of the last three years, 
(b) the conditions for regaining the right to unemployment benefits were 
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harmonized with the rules for qualifying for benefits for the first time. In 
both cases, the criteria will be 52 weeks of full-time employment during 
the last three years. Before the reform, the requirement for regaining 
the right to benefits was only 26 weeks (Madsen 2013). In 2015, the 
commission on unemployment benefits presented to the Danish 
government its proposals on an unemployment benefits reform (Nordic 
Labor Journal 2015). Among other things the commission suggests: (a) 
Maintain the existing demand for one year of employment in order to 
qualify for full unemployment benefit, but proposing to introduce a 
flexible qualification which would mean even just a few months of work 
could extend the benefit period. This should increase the incentive for 
accepting a job — including short-term ones, (b) a new calculation of the 
benefit level, based on hours, not weeks, (c) no benefit days during 
which you would not receive unemployment benefits, (d) maintain a 
two-year unemployment benefit period. 
 
Does flexicurity provide shelter from the crisis? 
The crisis and the policies adopted have brought the moment of truth 
for the Denmark’s successful flexicurity model. According to the latest 
available data, the harmonized unemployment rate continuously 
decreased over the past three years in Denmark reaching 6.2 percent of 
the labor force in July 2016, but the jobs gap is not yet closed as 
unemployment is still well above its pre-crisis level (3.2 percent). By 
comparison, unemployment is below to the OECD average (6.28 
percent) but still higher than in Germany (4.2 percent) (Eurostat 2016a, 
OECD 2016a). Unlike in many other countries in the Euro area, the 
incidence of long-term unemployment has recently decreased in 
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Denmark. Youth unemployment has followed a downwards trend since 
2012 and it has reached 11.9 percent in July 2016 but much higher than 
in Germany (7.2 percent). After declining continuously between 2007 
and 2013 employment stabilized and began to recover over the past 
year. Employment performance remains good in international 
comparison as almost three quarters of the working-age population has 
work  in Denmark (75 percent, Q1 2016), compared to  two thirds on 
average in the OECD and the EU28 (66.8 and 66.2 percent respectively) 
(OECD 2016b).  
 
Up the available evidence, Danish flexicurity seems to be able to provide 
some shelter from the storm of the crisis (Madsen 2013, Andersen 2015, 
Andersen and Svarer 2012). It also seems to be reasonably robust 
against political interventions of a more drastic nature that would go far 
in dismantling the traditional Danish version of flexicurity. The balance 
between flexibility and security has, without doubt, drifted away from 
the equilibrium that until recently gave the Danish model the 
widespread support from most political parties and the social partners 
(Madsen 2013). However, it seems to have performed well. Svarer and 
Andersen (2012:6-7) observed that the level of ALMP measured by 
activation rates for the unemployed has been maintained despite the 
crisis and the increase in unemployment. It was slightly above 20 
percent for the UIB-unemployed and 35-40 percent for the SA-
unemployed.  
 
OECD (2015) indicated that Denmark’s successful effort to tackle the 
adverse consequences of the crisis is owed to the strong activation 
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policies and their adjustability. In 2013, Denmark spent 1.8 percent of its 
GDP in active labor market programs, the highest level of all OECD 
countries. 
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In addition to that, a shift in the design of ALMPs could be observed. 
ALMPs have changed their content to reflect the changing labor market 
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and new evidence on effectiveness. Evidence points to the importance 
of early intervention, with a focus on the job search. To reduce locking-in 
effects and program costs, policies have shifted from expensive 
programs like classroom training to less expensive programs like on-the-
job training. When interventions come late, they have small, if any, 
effects, especially for groups that have been marginalized in the labor 
market. This underscores the importance of early intervention to 
prevent passive unemployment spells from becoming too long 
(Andersen 2015). The above shift is reflected in the ongoing trend 
regards the declining employment rates for low-educated workers. 
Despite high public spending on education, about one in five members 
of a cohort do not obtain an education that is relevant to labor market 
needs. The last observation points to a severe structural problem and to 
a group of workers that will be increasingly marginalized (Andersen 
2015).  
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Employment rate percent 2007-2015 
            
Source: OECD 2016, Labor Market Statistics 
 
Adjustability of the labor market is one more milestone on the road to 
recovery. In Denmark, adjustments took place through reductions in 
both the number of hours worked and in the number of employees. Job 
exit rates increased, and job entry rates declined. During 2008–2013, 
declines in the number of employees as a share of total adjustment in 
labor input reached 84–85 percent in the US and Denmark, compared 
with 53 percent in France and 58 percent in Italy. However, by 2013 job 
inflow rates had recovered to the levels seen before the boom. Gross job 
flows remained large in the Danish labor market despite the large 
macroeconomic effects of the crisis.  The transition rate from 
unemployment into employment within the first three months of 
unemployment has stabilized at 32 percent and at 40 percent after 12 
months of unemployment. Unemployment spells are short (in 2013, 
spells of shorter than three months accounted for close to 40 percent of 
total unemployment). This effectively serves as an implicit equal work 
sharing mechanism which has an important distributional perspective 
and also reduces the negative structural implications of high 
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unemployment. However, exit rates after the crisis stabilized at a level 
close to that in 2004, a year that business cycle forecasters consider to 
be close to neutral, in the sense that the unemployment rate was at the 
structural level. Inflow rates into unemployment show a similar pattern, 
with a peak after the onset of the great recession. High transition rates 
and short unemployment spells also imply that individuals may 
experience recurrent unemployment spells within the quarter or year 
(Andersen 2015).  
 
Fiscal buffers play an important role for the well-functioning of 
flexicurity model. A decline in employment causes expenditures on 
income support and active labor market policies to rise and tax revenue 
to decline, which worsens public finances. For the model to work well in 
bad times, prudence is required in good times. Public finance policies in 
Denmark have satisfied this condition (Andersen 2015). 
 
Another important dimension closely related to the well-functioning of 
the labor market is the wage equality. Denmark has one of the lowest 
rates and this is the mix result of an equal skills distribution as well as 
the supply of skills is abundant in relation to demand and last but not 
least wage setting mechanisms that set wages independently of market 
forces (OECD 2015). 
 
In an early assessment, the model has coped reasonably well with the 
crisis, and that it does not seem to be more exposed to the risk of high 
and persistent unemployment. However, there at least four open-ended 
issues which we should consider for the suitability of flexicurity in crisis 
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times and the transferability of the model (a) the ALMPs are an 
expensive policy tool. The experience shows the need for adequate fiscal 
buffers for the flexicurity model to work in a deep recession. A decline in 
employment causes expenditures on income support and active labor 
market policies to rise and tax revenue to decline, which worsens public 
finances, (b) the degree of reconciliation between unemployment 
support and job search incentives is a great challenge and places a heavy 
burden on active labor market policies, (c) will employment increase, or 
has structural unemployment increased? Up to the moment, the 
aggregate demand remains low in Denmark, and the importance of 
structural barriers will not have its real test until demand picks up, and 
(d) what would be the rate of job growth? As the activation policies may 
be business cycle dependent the answer will determine not only the 
effectiveness of activation policies but also do maintain the political 
support for them (Andersen 2015, Andersen and Svarer 2012). 
 
4.2  Greece 
In 2010 the Greek authorities, representatives of the European 
Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the so-called troika, signed the first Memorandum 
of Understanding for a loan agreement of €110 billion to Greece, which 
had become necessary as Greece had proven unable to manage its 
soaring public debt (129 percent of gross domestic product [GDP] in 
2009) and by then almost chronic budget deficit (reaching 14.9 percent 
of GDP in 2008). The memorandum committed the government to 
sweeping spending cuts and steep tax increases, aiming to reduce the 
country’s public deficit to below 3 percent of GDP by 2014 (Kougias 
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2014). Admittedly, some type of austerity was necessary for a state that 
was severely off track in its finances. The Greek authorities drastically 
cut social expenditures. This may have led to some streamlining of social 
spending but, above all, it resulted in the retreat of the state from the 
social protection of the salaried strata, the unemployed, the poor and 
the socially excluded (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2014:8). Despite the 
cuts and the revision of the provisions of the loan and the austerity 
program, incorrect assumptions and estimations in the drafting of the 
program, structural weaknesses, and political unwillingness resulted in a 
worsening of economic conditions (Kougias 2014). Two other bailout 
programs were signed in 2012 and 2015 of €130 and €86 billion 
respectively. 
 
However, there are few signs of economic recovery. According to the 
latest available data GDP decreased by 0.2 percent in 2015 and 
economic outlook has been worsening since then. Greece has been 
experiencing seven years of recession in the last eight years.  
 
The social cost was extremely high. As the austerity policies were 
introduced when the Greek economy was already in recession, their 
impact on the social fabric was tremendous. Unemployment rates have 
reached unprecedented levels, and for the first time since the early 
1960s, the active labor force is less than the inactive population. GDP 
has shrunk by almost a quarter, per capita income has decreased by 30 
percent, income distribution has deteriorated and the part of the 
population that runs the dangers of poverty and social exclusion has 
increased (Kougias 2014).  
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After the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974, the socio-economic 
integration was developed on a system of clientelism, statism, and 
corporatism that created vertical networks in which the political parties 
had the leading role, promising government jobs, social security perks 
and loss-making regional projects, all in order to win votes. On the other 
hand, strong family ties contributed to a relatively cohesive society, even 
though collective solidarity and generalized trust have persistently been 
weak in Greece (Petmesidou and Polyzoidis 2005: 128). The family 
played traditionally a double role in the reproduction of Greek society. It 
was the main provider of welfare to its members and a key institution in 
the reproduction of the Greek political economy (Papadopoulos and 
Roumpakis 2009: 5). Consequently, on the eve of the crisis the Greek 
social policy system was characterized by the predominance of 
contributory social transfers, mainly pensions; the dominance of 
unjustified social insurance privileges; the delayed evolution of universal 
welfare policies, mainly in health care; the underdevelopment of social 
assistance and social care services; poor unemployment protection; 
distributional imbalances and administrative inefficiency; and non-
existent family policy (Venieris and Papatheodorou 2003; Petmesidou 
and Mossialos 2006). 
 
The resulting social security mosaic granted high benefits to privileged 
groups of public servants; generous insurance benefits to powerful 
occupational groups (rarely justified by their contribution record); poor 
insurance provision to average working people; and meager social 
assistance benefits to those in great need. Only 50 percent of the 
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beneficiaries belonged to the poorest 30 percent of the population, 
making coverage for the neediest inadequate (OECD 2013). As a result of 
gaps in the social safety net, the effectiveness of social benefits in 
reducing poverty remained much lower than elsewhere in Europe. 
Although social spending rose from 19.9 to 26 percent for the period 
1995–2008 and was then near the EU-15 average of 27.5 percent, the 
risk of poverty after social benefits remained one of the highest in the 
European Union, at a rate from 20 to 21 percent (Dafermos and 
Papatheodorou 2012).  
 
Employment policy costs in Greece before the current crisis were minor, 
absorbing less 1 percent of annual GDP (0.7 percent of GDP was spent 
on benefits and less than 0.25 percent of GDP was spent on active labor 
market measures) and the number of beneficiaries was less than one-
fifth of the registered unemployed population (Dimoulas 2014). Most 
evaluation studies relating to the impact of active labor policies in 
Greece supporting subsidized job placements estimate that 25 to 30 
percent of beneficiaries remained in employment after the end of the 
subsidized period (Dimoulas and Michalopoulou 2008) and this means 
that the net effect in the total employment level was less than 0.3 
percent although applied in the context of high annual economic growth 
(Dimoulas 2014). Active labor markets have supported clientelism, 
financially assisting certain segments of society as the beneficiaries of 
active employment policies in Greece are not the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged but those with established network contacts with political 
party leaders (Dimoulas 2014, Dimoulas and Michalopoulou 2008). Labor 
market measures function indirectly as a method offering financial 
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support to only part of the unemployed population, allowing politicians 
to manage the social problem of high unemployment in the context of 
traditional political networks by selecting the beneficiaries thus 
valorizing extended clientelistic practices (Dimoulas 2014). 
Austerity policies were introduced when the Greek economy was 
already in recession, and that made the latter deeper. The measures 
focused on the rapid reduction of salaries in the public sector which 
were also transmitted to the private sector causing a severe reduction in 
the purchasing power of most Greeks (Dimoulas 2014). As the demand 
for goods and services fell, many businesses went bankrupt, others 
relocated and most of those staying afloat resorted to layoffs and/or pay 
arrears. As a result, GDP at the end of 2015 the size of the economy 
contracted by almost 25 percent in real terms relative to 2007. So deep 
and drawn out a recession simply has no precedent in the economic 
history of any advanced economy in peace time (Matsaganis and Leventi 
2014).  This, in turn, led to a steep rise in unemployment rates and the 
challenge of addressing high unemployment rates became the most 
significant task besides the avoidance of default (Dimoulas 2014). 
 
In an attempt to increase competitiveness three successive governments 
moved towards the adoption of measures which inspired by the spirit of 
labor cost reduction. The most substantial measures intended to 
increase the availability of work by reducing the cost of hiring and firing.  
Apart from freezing the new recruitment in public services over the past 
five years, the policy reforms have focused primarily on promoting a 
“unilateral” version of flexicurity. The measures adopted were directed 
at five objectives: (1) decentralizing the wage bargaining system; (2) 
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weakening EPL for permanent employment; (3) reducing the minimum 
wage (the statutory minimum salary has been cut by 32 percent to €511 
per month for full-time employees under twenty-five years of age, and 
by 22 percent to €586 for over twenty-five); and (4) increasing working 
time flexibility through the increasing utilization of rotational work and 
fixed time contracts.  The legal workweek of forty hours has, for 
example, been converted to an annual basis, and can now fluctuate 
more widely, depending on the economic situation (OECD 2013: 88) (5) 
reducing the firing costs (financial and legal). Redundancy compensation 
levels decreased by 50 percent and the legal levels of collective 
dismissals from each firm increased from 2 percent to 5 percent of the 
workforce per month. 
 
According to OECD indicators, the legislation is now just as “flexible” as it 
is in Austria or Denmark for permanent jobs, and the EPL indicator for 
Greece has neared the OECD average (OECD 2013: 90). During the 
period 2009–2012 flexible forms of employment increased from 21 
percent to 45 percent; regular, long-term employment contracts 
decreased from 79 percent to 55 percent. It is quite characteristic that 
according to Ergani data in the first five months of 2016 there were 
824.016 recruitments but only half of them were for full-time jobs 
(Imerisia 2016).   
 
The price for these changes is huge. Apart from being larger than initially 
envisaged, the fiscal consolidation in Greece has had a large impact on 
economic activity, employment, unemployment and disposable income. 
According to the latest data, the cumulative GDP (in the six years from 
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2008 to 2014) reduced by 23.2 percent, and purchasing power (GDP per 
capita at constant prices) returned to the level of the year 2000. On 
average, about one-third of income has been lost, and the available real 
household income from work has been decreased by €41 billion (2011–
2013), bringing domestic demand back to the level of 1990 (–32.4 
percent since 2009). More than €45 billion have been lost, along with 
one million jobs. Productivity has decreased by 6.5 percent. 
Unemployment increased to 23.4 percent (June 2016) the highest in the 
EU28–it had peaked 27.5 percent in 2013. 47.7 percent of young people 
are without a job (June 2016), and the unemployment rate for women is 
at 27.8 percent (July 2016). Long-term unemployment reached 18.2 
percent in 2015 as the share of the active population (Eurostat 2016a) 
representing more than 73 percent of the registered unemployed. The 
employment rate has gone down to 54.9 percent, which is far below the 
Europe 2020 target of 70 percent. The reductions of the nominal value 
of minimum wage affected the minimum-to-median wage ratio in 
Greece which fell to 45 percent, below the OECD average of 50 percent 
(OECD 2015). 
 
Against this background the social protection system in Greece proved 
to be inadequately prepared to manage the crisis. Strikingly, in the 
hardest-hit country public social spending in real terms plunged by about 
18 percent, even though social needs enormously increased 
(Petmesidou and Guillen 2014). 
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Unemployed are not given adequate social protection. The number of 
beneficiaries of employment benefits and social assistance represented 
less than 20 percent of those registered as unemployed before the crisis 
and now represent less than 16 percent (Dimoulas (2014). According to 
the latest available data (June 2016) only 10 percent of unemployed 
receive any kind of benefits from Employment Services as well as only 
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1.5 percent of long-term unemployed receive the additional benefit of 
€200 (Dikaiologitika 2016). In-work poverty incidences increased from 
11.9 percent to 13.4 percent (it had peaked at 15.1 percent in 2013) as a 
combined result of increased flexibility, reduction of nominal minimum 
wage and deregulation of labor market (Papatheodorou 2014). 
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There has been a tightening of restrictions on access to social security 
provisions introducing stricter requirements for eligibility to benefits 
while decreasing both the duration and level of payments. Employment 
policies to support the most vulnerable are financed by block grants and 
the beneficiaries are limited in number. The employment measures 
adopted to that end have three policy dimensions (a) the reduction of 
labor costs combined with an increase in flexible working arrangements, 
(b) the enhancement of employability and (c) the employment in not for 
profit agencies and public services through fixed-term employment 
contracts (Dimoulas 2014). In addition training vouchers co-financed by 
the EC’s European Social Fund were introduced but the clientelistic 
approach undermined the efficiency of the schemes. Along with them 
there were employment schemes which subsidized employer’s social 
contributions and empowered qualified workforce through pre-defined 
lump sum financial assistance to create their own business. Last but not 
least the utilization of fixed term quasi-employment in community and 
public services as a workfare tool providing a minimum fixed income but 
few rights under EU law to unemployed workers should be mentioned 
(Dimoulas 2014). According to the latest program a total of 33.065 
unemployed will be hired in the 325 Municipalities of the country for 8 
eight months by the end of October 2016. 
 
Employment policies adopted to address the issue of unemployment 
have been unable to manage the crisis so far (OECD 2015). On the one 
hand, the number of beneficiaries is rather limited (Dimoulas 2014) and 
on the other hand, active employment support for jobseekers and low-
income workers remains low (OECD 2015). Around 27 percent of 15-29-
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year-old youth in 2014 were neither in employment nor in education or 
training (NEET). While the NEET rate in Greece has historically been 
higher than the OECD average, the difference rose from just 3 to 13 
percentage points since the onset of the crisis (OECD 2015). 
 
Before the crisis, Greece did not have an integrated income support 
provided to the poor on the criterion of extreme poverty and only on 
that (Minimum Guarantee Income). A temporary package of 
humanitarian measures on food, housing and access to electricity has 
been adopted and will be phased-out to coincide with the 
implementation of the nationwide rollout of the guaranteed minimum 
income scheme. 
 
The cost of the national implementation of the GMI, estimated at 0.5% 
of GDP annually, will be covered through permanent savings. The 
Authorities will launch the gradual nationwide roll-out of a GMI scheme 
in 30 municipalities by June 2016. Apart from direct income support, the 
GMI scheme will offer a package of services that will aim to inclusion and 
remove barriers to work. The GMI will be closely co-ordinated with re-
integration employment schemes whereby alternative pathways will be 
offered to the beneficiaries addressing their specific needs, including 
their integration in existing schemes. By September 2016, the authorities 
will make the full preparations for a nationwide GMI rollout starting on 1 
January 2017. GMI beneficiaries who can be integrated into the labor 
market will be progressively offered access to personalized active labor 
market (ALM) measures. This will include the systematic preparation of 
individual activation plans for participants and measures taken for 
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allocating employment scheme funds (including GMI recipient quotas). 
The menu of ALM measures offered will include training, reintegration 
employment schemes, job search assistance, mentoring, apprenticeships 
etc. by January 2017 that will cover at least 10% of GMI beneficiaries 
available for work (European Commission 2016). Recipients’ annual 
income should be less than the amount corresponding to the poverty 
threshold.  The recipients of the program will receive €200 per month. 
Couples will get €300 plus another €50 for each child under the age of 
18. If they have children over 18, the amount will increase to €100. 
 
The Greek labor market has become more flexible for firms but 
considerably less secure for workers. Industrial relations have 
deteriorated; collective bargaining has virtually been abandoned, 
shifting the balance of power at workplaces to the disadvantage of the 
workers (Matsaganis 2013). A policy of rapid and extremely harsh 
deregulation/“flexibilization” has taken place, documented by the 
disturbance of the equilibrium between protective labor legislation and 
non-protective unemployment provisions (Venieris 2013). The viability 
of the unilateral flexicurity approach is at stake, to put it mildly. It is 
quite indicative that the already unacceptably large informal labor 
market (Petmesidou and Polyzoidis 2005) appears to be increasing 
steadily (Matsaganis 2013), negatively affecting both tax receipts and 
insurance contributions. On the other hand, after a period of continuous 
rise Greek exports show signs of fatigue, implying that the strategy of 
“internal devaluation” has probably reached its limits. 
 
In the Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding sent to the Greek 
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government in June 2016 as part of the agreement of August 2015 laid 
out a series of actions it needs to be implemented. The document 
provides that the Greek government will have to introduce changes in 
the pension system, the social security, and the labor force market by 
Autumn 2016, while particular attention is given to the need for aligning 
labor force laws with best European practices, including the issue of 
large scale lay-offs. The report points out that 3 per cent of GDP will be 
saved until 2025 due to the measures implemented from 2015 till now. 
Top priority is given to the complete implementation of the Minimum 
Guaranteed Income till October, while the document also requires the 
change of family benefits and disability pensions until September with 
increasing public expenditure. On the matter of labor, the aim of the 
new program is to maintain the progress achieved so far, including 
combating unemployment and more labor market flexibility. The 
institutions ruled out the prospect of the government changing the 
current framework of the collective labor bargaining. The current main 
pensions will freeze until they equal the new pensions that are 
calculated based on the new unified regulations. Finally, Social Solidarity 
Pension (EKAS) will gradually be scrapped by December 2019 starting at 
the top tier of the beneficiaries (European Commission 2016).   
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Do flexicurity policies withstand during crisis times and shelter labor 
markets from shocks? The two parallel stories reflect how different is 
perceived the concept of flexicurity by policy makers. Even though the 
need of tight budget balances is common in both cases (although in 
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Greece is stronger as it is mandated by MoU) the philosophy of 
employment reforms is totally different and shows two different worlds 
of flexicurity. The Danish model won fame and considered to be a much-
cited example of a real life flexicurity in 2000s. The 2008 crisis 
challenged the so far succeeded model and questioned its sustainability. 
Even though the reforms adopted moved towards “work first” approach 
and tighten eligibility rules for social benefits for unemployed, the 
Danish model seem to find a road to success and recovery. Gross job 
flows in Denmark remain high, most unemployment spells are short, and 
there are no strong signs of an increase in long-term unemployment. 
The balance between flexibility and security has without doubt drifted 
away from the equilibrium that until recently gave the Danish model the 
widespread support from most political parties and the social partners 
(Madsen 2013), however social protection is still maintain its universal 
features. More than 85 percent of the employed will receive some form 
of income support, if becoming unemployed while ad hoc measures 
have been taken to cover cases for the rest 15 percent (Andersen 2015). 
The reforms of active labor market policies towards intensification of job 
search on behalf of unemployed workers and skill updating seem to have 
performed well. Last but not least the existence of fiscal buffers 
contributed for the well-functioning of flexicurity model. A decline in 
employment causes expenditures on income support and active labor 
market policies to rise and tax revenue to decline, which worsens public 
finances. Among OECD countries, Denmark has the public budget that is 
most sensitive to economic conditions. For the flexicurity model to 
operate in a recession, the budget at the outset of an economic 
downturn must be in a position to absorb the impacts of cyclical 
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changes. For the model to work well in bad times, prudence is required 
in good times. Public finance policies in Denmark have been prudent in 
good times and this gave room for maneuvering in bad times. 
On the other hand Greece suffered the worst crisis since the end of 
WWII. The severe economic crisis affecting Greece is widely thought to 
be having a significant social impact in terms of greater inequality and 
increased poverty. The austerity policies taken to reduce fiscal deficits in 
combination with the wider recession has created an explosive cocktail 
of conditions which urge more people into the edges of society running 
the risk of social exclusion. This situation calls for an adequate social 
protection system as well as a more equal burden sharing of austerity. 
This implies the need of redesigning policies to reduce Greece’s deficit in 
order to minimize losses for lower income groups, and restore 
distributional justice making austerity policies more acceptable 
(Matsaganis and Leventi 2014). Recent job and income losses have 
greatly increased the demand for social protection, but the response of 
the Greek welfare state has been inadequate. Before the crisis social 
protection in Greece delayed the necessary adjustments to confront the 
challenges of globalization and European Monetary Union. This seems to 
be catastrophic as the crisis exposed the weaknesses of social protection 
regime and made harder for the system to absorb shocks from the 
economic downturn and provide social security to weakest groups for 
their losses. This in turn increased the risk of large and rigid social gaps 
as a large spectrum of socio-occupational groups progressively losing 
ground. Employment and welfare regime are highly challenged during 
the crisis. Unemployment rate rocketed to 25 percent with few signs of 
recovery. In order to increase competitiveness and tackle high 
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unemployment Greece opted for a flexible labor market without 
providing at the same time an adequate safety net for those who 
experience difficulties during transition periods. The initiatives adopted 
taken the form of changes in the labor legislation including measures 
which reduce labor cost, cut minimum wage and facilitate hiring and 
firing, maintain employment through subsidization of worker’s social 
contributions, vocational training through work practice voucher options 
and workfare scheme through fixed-term employment in community or 
public services. So far these legislative initiatives proved ineffective in 
terms of supporting employment as they failed to curb the steep rise in 
unemployment –while the rise in the number of fixed-term and part-
time contracts were incapable of counterbalancing the reduction in full-
time employment. The measures do not increase the ratio between 
benefit recipients and the total number of registered unemployed while 
they do not provide adequate recourses to program participants. The 
initiatives are not part of a comprehensive strategy and seem to be 
adopted according to the predefined priorities and targets of European 
Structural Funds. As the crisis is unfolding it is more than clear that 
different “worlds” of flexicurity coexist making the concept more path 
depended.   
Could flexicurity provide a shelter against crisis? The study of the two 
countries provides us the chance to draw some valuable lessons 
regarding the added value of the concept in times of crisis. 
The example of Denmark clearly shows that the concept of flexicurity 
can correspond to its mission if and only if the core of ALMP maintains 
its dynamics. It is more than a simple necessity to increase the expenses 
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for ALMP during the crisis and this reflects the added value of prudence 
in good times. Even though it is extremely difficult to increase 
employment during the crisis it is crucial to maintaining and 
strengthening ALMP in order to avoid long-term unemployment. 
Denmark used the tool of ALMP to stop the increasing trend of long-
term unemployment while in Greece ALMPS seem to have failed to cope 
with the incidence of long-term unemployment as long term 
unemployed exceeds 73 per cent of the total unemployed. 
The experience from the two countries shows clearly the importance of 
early intervention, with a focus on the job search. In Denmark in order to 
reduce locking-in effects and program costs, policies have shifted from 
expensive programs like classroom training to less expensive programs 
like on-the-job training. When interventions come late, they have small, 
if any, effects, especially for groups that have been marginalized in the 
labor market. In Greece interventions had a rather restrictive approach, 
came at a rather late stage and thus have failed up to the moment to 
prevent passive unemployment spells from becoming too long. It seems 
that there is an inversely proportional relationship between the time of 
implementation and the effectiveness of measures.  
The implementation of ALMP stresses the need for a continuous 
feedback. Though is a rather difficult task to assess the effectiveness of 
labor market interventions, flexicurity policies should be embedded 
within a system of a continuous feedback given that these policies 
function as natural experiments which provide valuable insights 
(Andersen and Svarer 2012). The recent changes in the structure of 
training programs in Denmark show the importance of continuous 
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redesigning in the light of both financial needs and measure 
effectiveness. 
The case of Greece seems to verify the insights of Svarer and Andersen 
(2012) regarding the depreciation of human capital. Though it is not 
clear whether there is a case for strengthening or weakening ALMP with 
the business cycle situation, depreciation of human capital with the 
duration of unemployment spells calls for intervention to restrain this 
process which eventually leads to an increase in the structural 
unemployment rate. In Greece, the process of depreciation of human 
capital has led to both a dramatic increase in long-term unemployment 
and a devastating brain drain which complicates further the road to 
recovery.  
ALMP should be embedded in a coherent and integrated framework of 
action. While this is the case in Denmark, in Greece fragmented 
employment initiatives do not provide either increased coverage or 
adequate answer to the complexity of the crisis.   
Flexicurity needs adequate fiscal buffers to work in a deep recession. A 
decline in employment causes expenditures on income support and 
active labor market policies to rise and tax revenue to decline, which 
worsens public finances (Andersen 2015). For the model to work well in 
bad times, prudence is required in good times. This is highly associated 
with the dual nature of flexicurity. Increasing flexibility can solve many 
problems and lift rigidities in labor markets however it creates problems 
which in the long run may prove to be structural and thus more difficult 
to deal with. Economic support for those who lose their jobs, the active 
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labor market in order to avoid deprecation of human capital are the sine 
qua non preconditions to avoid a frail social fabric.    
The above mentioned lessons should be complemented by the wider 
European experience on flexicurity strategies during crisis.  As lay-offs 
became necessary in most of the Member States, and the demand from 
trade unions for ‘job security’ intensified, the debate on flexicurity has 
been revitalised, this time driven by a lack of demand for workers. 
Employment reforms during crisis seem to favor flexibility over security, 
however the empirical results are rather mixed. Some of the ‘flexicure’ 
countries have not been performing best in terms of output gap, public 
debt, size of bail-out packages and unemployment rates during and in 
the aftermath of the economic crisis according to some empirical 
studies. Tangian (2010) indicates that the crisis manifests itself more in 
countries with high flexibility and somewhat less in countries with 
generous social security. High flexibility probably encourages risky 
economic behaviour on the part of firms and increases public 
expenditure during the crisis. On the other hand, highly developed social 
security, public works and other forms of state participation render the 
economy less dependent on the private sector and protect it from 
occasional shocks. Although this downsizing, as an important component 
of the flexicurity model, is supposed to be followed by efficient 
employment services and active labor market policies, there is not yet 
empirical evidence whether this has been the case or not (Auer 2010). 
Under the same vein Chatani and Auer (2011) observe that employment 
systems that combine stricter employment protection with internal 
flexibility helped by government policies appear as an attractive 
alternative to the “classical” flexicurity pattern of loose employment 
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protection with external adjustment flexibility coupled to good social 
protection. However this shift has its limits: as structural adjustment is 
bound to increase in the future, all economies will need policies 
supporting those outside stable employment relationships to avoid 
increasing segmentation of their labor markets in insiders and outsiders. 
These policies have to support transitions on the labor market, support 
those losing jobs and those accessing jobs, in particular young people 
and some of the continental countries have no particular good record in 
this regard. Thus the need for both adjustment flexibility and worker 
security remains. Boeri based on panels of OECD countries and of more 
than 50 countries suggests that “flexicurity” configurations, which are 
characterized by less job protection and more support for the 
unemployed, should emerge in countries in which a larger fraction of the 
population is skilled. Even wishing to move with greater speed toward 
flexicurity (i.e., before the investment in education is repaid with a 
significant increase in the share of high-skill workers): reforms of job 
protection need to trade labor market flexibility against state-provided 
unemployment insurance. In countries with a well-developed capital 
market, an unemployment benefit system whose redistributions are 
strongly in favor of the low-skill segments of the workforce could also 
increase support for flexicurity (Boeri et al. 2012).  
Will flexicurity retain its conceptual validity in the post crisis era? 
Probably yes, if policy makers will incorporate the dynamic dimension of 
security in their plans towards more and better jobs. On the contrary, if 
they opt for flexibility ignoring the need for secure employment 
transitions, the concept will be surpassed by the new social reality and 
the needs for more social inclusion that have emerged since 2008. 
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